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Abstract:	Disagreeing	with	others	about	how	to	interpret	a	social	interaction	is	a	common	occurrence.	We	often	find	ourselves	offering	divergent	interpretations	of	others’	motives,	intentions,	beliefs,	and	emotions.	Remarkably,	philosophical	accounts	of	how	we	understand	others	do	not	explain,	or	even	attempt	to	explain	such	disagreements.	I	argue	these	disparities	in	social	interpretation	stem,	in	large	part,	from	the	effect	of	social	categorization	and	our	goals	in	social	interactions,	phenomena	long	studied	by	social	psychologists.	I	argue	we	ought	to	expand	our	accounts	of	how	we	understand	others	in	order	to	accommodate	these	data	and	explain	how	such	profound	disagreements	arise	amongst	informed,	rational,	well-meaning	individuals.			
1.	Introduction1		On	July	17,	2014	in	Staten	Island,	NY,	Eric	Garner	was	stopped	by	police	officers	allegedly	for	selling	loose	cigarettes.	After	conversing	with	five	police	officers	for	several	minutes,	one	police	officer	grabbed	Garner’s	wrist	and	Garner	swatted	away	his	hand.	That	police	officer	then	put	his	arm	around	Garner’s	neck	and	pulled	him	backwards	onto	the	ground,	putting	him	in	a	chokehold	position.	Once	Garner	was	
																																																								1	I	have	talked	about	the	ideas	in	this	paper	with	many	people.	I	am	particularly	grateful	for	my	conversations	with	the	following	people:	Lauren	Ashwell,	Mikkel	Gerken,	Brie	Gertler,	Suilin	Lavelle,	Karen	Neander,	Carlotta	Pavese,	Guillermo	del	Pinal,	Sarah	Robins,	Armin	Schulz,	Robert	Thompson,	Evan	Westra,	and	Tad	Zawidzki.	Thanks	also	to	the	audiences	at	Coastal	Carolina	University,	Mississippi	State	University,	University	of	Houston,	George	Washington	University,	and	University	of	Kansas.	Finally,	thanks	to	two	anonymous	referees	at	this	journal.	Their	feedback	helped	me	develop	my	critiques	and	and	positive	arguments.	
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on	the	ground,	the	other	four	police	officers	helped	to	restrain	him	by	kneeling	on	his	back	and	cuffing	his	hands	behind	his	back.	Over	the	course	of	several	minutes	while	lying	face	down	on	the	sidewalk,	Garner	repeated	11	times	“I	can’t	breathe.”	The	police	officers	did	nothing	to	help	him	breathe.	After	Garner	lost	consciousness,	the	police	officers	turned	him	on	his	side.	The	ambulance	arrived	7	minutes	later.	They	did	not	perform	CPR	or	administer	oxygen.	Garner	was	transported	to	the	hospital	and	pronounced	dead	on	arrival.	The	medical	examiners	determined	that	the	cause	of	death	was	the	police	officer’s	chokehold	and	subsequent	restraint,	and	the	death	was	ruled	a	homicide.	The	entire	event	was	captured	on	video.	Despite	having	a	clear	video	recording	of	the	interaction	between	Garner	and	the	police	officers,	interpretations	of	this	event	varied	widely.	Some	interpreted	Garner’s	behavior	as	innocuous	and	viewed	the	police	officers’	behavior	as	unjustified	police	aggression.	Others	interpreted	Garner’s	behavior	as	threatening	and	viewed	the	police	officers’	behavior	as	an	appropriate,	justified	response	to	a	dangerous	situation.	This	disagreement	was	widely	discussed	online	and	on	television	in	the	aftermath	of	the	event	itself	and	after	a	grand	jury	decided	not	to	indict	the	officer	who	put	Garner	in	a	chokehold.	The	radio	program	This	American	Life	(episode	548)	documented	two	people	watching	the	video	together	to	see	if	they	could	find	common	ground.	One	person	was	a	producer	for	This	American	Life	who	had	worked	in	a	correctional	facility,	and	the	other	person	was	her	friend,	a	New	York	City	police	officer.	The	producer	is	Black,	and	the	police	officer	is	White.	
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After	a	four-hour	conversation,	much	to	their	dismay,	the	two	women	could	find	almost	no	common	ground	in	their	interpretation	of	the	event.2		How	can	there	be	such	strong	disagreement	among	those	who	saw	the	very	same	video?	Many	hostile	encounters	between	police	and	citizens	are	unrecorded,	and	both	police	advocates	and	civil	rights	leaders	say	that	things	would	be	much	clearer	if	we	could	just	see	exactly	what	happened.	The	disagreements	over	the	Garner	case	suggest	that	that	is	not	true.	Disagreements	persist	despite	clear	video	evidence.	How	can	this	be?	Interpreting	the	encounter	between	Garner	and	the	police	involves	evaluating	the	behaviors,	for	example,	as	aggressive	or	unthreatening,	inferring	the	motives	of	Garner	and	the	police	officers,	judging	what	the	police	knew	and	what	Garner	was	trying	to	do.	This	kind	of	social	interpretation	is	a	task	of	theory	of	mind.	Theory	of	mind	is	the	capacity	to	understand	people	in	terms	of	mental	states.	A	central	part	of	theory	of	mind	is	mindreading,	the	process	of	attributing	mental	states	to	others,	e.g.,	beliefs,	desires,	intentions,	and	emotions,	in	order	to	interpret	and	anticipate	their	behavior.		People	starkly	disagree	about	how	to	mindread	Garner	and	the	police	officers,	despite	the	seemingly	unambiguous	video	evidence.	For	example,	in	the	conversation	reported	in	the	This	American	Life	episode,	the	police	officer	interpreted	Garner	as	refusing	to	be	arrested	and	stalling	the	police.	Even	when	he	was	lying	on	the	ground,	the	police	officer	interpreted	Garner	as	willfully	disobeying	the	police’s	instructions.	In	contrast,	the	producer	interpreted	Garner	as	trying	to																																																									2	You	can	access	this	episode	at	http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/548/cops-see-it-differently-part-two?act=0#play.		
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reason	with	the	police,	not	resisting.	And	when	Garner	was	lying	on	the	ground,	the	producer	could	see	him	only	as	thoroughly	detained	and	sincerely	reporting	that	he	cannot	breathe.	She	asked,	“Don't	you	see	that	this	person	is	in	pain	struggling	to	communicate?”	The	police	officer	and	producer	disagreed	about	Garner’s	mental	states,	e.g.,	what	he	desired	and	intended.	Both	women	were	frustrated	by	their	disagreement	because	they	were	convinced	that	their	own	interpretation	obviously	was	correct.3		This	divergence	in	interpretations	of	Garner’s	mental	states	raises	the	question:	How	do	we	attribute	mental	states	to	others?	Philosophers	have	converged	on	a	general	answer,	viz.,	through	a	range	of	processes	involving	simulation	and	theorizing	(Goldman,	2006;	Nichols	&	Stich,	2003).	Such	hybrid	accounts	of	mindreading	aim	to	explain	the	various	strategies	we	employ	to	understand	others’	behavior.	Remarkably,	however,	these	accounts	of	mindreading																																																									3	Of	course,	not	all	disagreements	about	this	and	other	such	cases	stem	solely	from	disagreements	about	the	mental	states	of	the	observed	agents.	Disagreements	have	many	causes,	e.g.,	misinformation,	limited	knowledge,	false	beliefs.	Three	kinds	of	disagreement	stand	out	as	theoretically	interesting,	though:	those	that	result	from	(1)	disagreements	about	mental	states	(about	what	someone	was	thinking,	feeling,	or	intending),	(2)	disagreements	about	norms	(about	what	is	appropriate	to	think	and	do	in	a	given	situation),	and	(3)	disagreements	about	both	mental	states	and	norms.	I	take	it	that	many	disagreements	about	the	Garner	case	and	others	like	it	are	of	the	third	sort.	Disagreeing	observers	tend	to	have	different	opinions	about	how	citizens	and	police	ought	to	behave,	but	they	also	disagree	about	what	Garner	and	the	police	were	thinking	and	trying	to	do,	e.g.,	whether	a	police	officer	felt	mortally	threatened	or	about	what	a	citizen	was	intending	to	do.	The	commentary	from	This	American	Life	illustrates	this	well.	In	these	cases,	disagreements	about	norms	and	mental	states	often	are	intertwined	and	difficult	to	pull	apart.	This	is	one	reason	that	conversations	about	such	cases	are	so	difficult.	I	focus	on	the	different	inferences	about	mental	states	because,	unlike	disagreements	about	norms,	this	has	received	relatively	little	attention	in	the	analyses	of	these	deep-rooted	disagreements.	Thanks	to	a	reviewer	for	highlighting	norms	as	an	additional	source	of	disagreement	in	these	cases.	
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do	not	explain,	or	even	attempt	to	explain,	deep	disagreements	about	the	interpretation	of	social	interactions.4	Reading	the	philosophical	literature	on	mindreading,	one	easily	could	come	away	with	the	impression	that	neurotypical	adults	rarely	disagree	about	what	others	are	thinking,	feeling,	intending,	etc.	The	Garner	case	is	a	tragic	and	dramatic	reminder	that	this	is	not	true.	Despite	having	access	to	the	same	evidence,	intelligent,	rational,	well-meaning	people	profoundly	disagree	about	how	to	interpret	this	situation.	In	fact,	such	disagreements	over	social	interpretation	are	common	in	our	everyday	lives,	both	in	cases	where	the	events	are	well	documented	and	in	cases	where	they	are	not.	I	shall	argue	that	figuring	out	how	these	disagreements	arise	illuminates	aspects	of	mindreading	that	have	received	little	attention	from	philosophers.		As	it	stands,	contemporary	philosophical	accounts	of	mindreading	do	not	address	these	profound	disagreements	about	social	interpretation.	We	can	rectify	this	problem	by	expanding	accounts	of	mindreading	to	incorporate	psychological	phenomena	long	studied	by	social	psychologists.	I	will	argue	that	the	kind	of	disparity	in	mental	state	attributions	present	in	the	Garner	case	stems,	in	large	part,	from	the	effect	of	social	categorization	and	the	ways	in	which	our	goals	influence	our	approaches	in	a	social	interaction.	These	phenomena	play	an	important	role	in	shaping	our	social	interpretations.	Specifically,	I	will	argue	that	they	influence	both	the	input	and	processing	of	mindreading.	With	such	an	expansion	we	can	explain	these	disagreements	and	offer	a	more	complete,	accurate	account	of	mindreading.	
																																																								4	In	fact,	neither	of	the	two	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy	entries	on	mindreading	address	such	disagreements	(Gordon,	2009;	Ravenscroft,	2010).	
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There	is	a	high	theoretical	payoff	for	examining	the	intersection	of	theory	of	mind	and	social	psychology.	But	there	is	more	than	just	a	theoretical	payoff.	It	is	important	for	us	to	understand	how	informed,	well	meaning	individuals	can	disagree	so	profoundly	about	the	interpretation	of	a	social	interaction.	Understanding	the	factors	that	shape	our	social	interpretations	may	help	us	understand	one	another	better,	which	is	essential	for	flourishing	in	diverse,	multicultural	societies.			
2.	Theory	of	Mind			In	this	section,	I	shall	give	a	brief	introduction	to	theory	of	mind.	This	introduction	serves	two	purposes:	It	shows	what	the	theory	of	mind	literature	focuses	on	and	by	implication	what	it	does	not	focus	on,	and	it	sets	the	stage	for	my	critique	of	the	theory	of	mind	literature	later	in	the	paper.		We	are	intensely	social	creatures,	and	as	such	theory	of	mind	is	central	to	our	everyday	lives.	The	developmental	psychologist	Henry	Wellman	offers	the	following	compelling	description	of	the	role	of	theory	of	mind	in	our	lives.	We	humans	live	socially—raised	by	parents,	in	familial	communities	constantly	interacting	with,	caring	about,	and	working	with	other	people.	We	not	only	live	socially,	we	think	socially—developing	and	depending	on	extensive	knowledge	about	social	life,	social	entities	(persons,	friends,	rivals,	clans,	families),	as	well	as	social	actions	and	interactions	(loving,	aggressing,	advising).	Conceivably,	the	vast	array	of	social	cognition	that	humans	acquire	could	be	a	loosely	connected,	even	disconnected,	array	of	separate	facts,	ideas,	and	conventional	truisms.	But	the	claim	behind	the	phrase	theory	of	mind	is	that	human	social	cognition	is	founded	on	an	understanding	of	ourselves	and	others	in	terms	of	our	inner,	mental,	psychological	states	(Wellman,	2014,	p.	2)		
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Two	competing	accounts	of	mindreading	have	dominated	the	theory	of	mind	literature:	the	Theory	Theory	(TT)	and	the	Simulation	Theory	(ST).	The	TT	holds	that	we	explain	and	predict	behavior	by	employing	a	tacit	folk	psychological	theory	about	how	mental	states	inform	behavior	(Carruthers	&	Smith,	1996;	Davies	&	Stone,	1995a;	Nichols	&	Stich,	2003).	With	our	folk	psychological	theory,	we	infer	from	a	target’s	behavior	what	his	or	her	mental	states	probably	are,	and	thereby	explain	the	behavior.	From	these	inferences,	plus	the	psychological	principles	in	the	theory	connecting	mental	states	to	behavior,	we	predict	the	target’s	behavior.		The	ST,	in	contrast,	holds	that	we	explain	and	predict	a	target’s	behavior	by	using	our	own	minds	as	a	simulation	of	the	other	person’s	mind	(Currie	&	Ravenscroft,	2002;	Davies	&	Stone,	1995b;	Gordon,	1992;	Heal,	1998).	To	explain	a	target’s	behavior,	we	put	ourselves	in	another’s	shoes,	so	to	speak,	and	imagine	what	our	mental	states	would	be	and	how	we	would	behave	if	we	were	that	agent	in	that	particular	situation.	To	predict	a	target’s	behavior,	we	take	the	attributed	mental	states	as	input	and	simulate	the	target’s	decision	about	what	to	do	next.	In	addition	to	what	we	might	call	pure	TT	and	pure	ST	are	hybrid	accounts	that	incorporate	elements	of	both	TT	and	ST.		Hybrid	accounts	aim	to	capture	the	theoretical	advantages	of	ST	and	TT	while	avoiding	the	problems	with	both	theories.	For	example,	Shaun	Nichols	and	Stephen	Stich	(2003)	have	developed	a	TT-centric	hybrid	account,	and	Alvin	Goldman	(2006)	has	developed	a	ST-centric	hybrid	account.	These	two	innovative	accounts	have	served	as	pillars	for	the	philosophical	mindreading	literature,	and	they	aim	to	give	comprehensive,	unified	accounts	of	mindreading	in	our	everyday	lives.		
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The	TT,	ST,	and	the	various	hybrid	theories	focus	on	when,	how,	and	what	mental	states	we	attribute	to	others,	i.e.,	attributional	cognitive	processes.	Debates	within	theory	of	mind	concern	theorizing	vs.	simulational	mindreading	(Davies	&	Stone,	1995a,	1995b),	the	ontogenetic	development	of	theory	of	mind	(Apperly	&	Butterfill,	2009),	phylogenetic	development	of	theory	of	mind	(Andrews,	2008;	Lurz,	2009;	Premack	&	Woodruff,	1978),	the	kinds	of	mental	state	concepts	required	for	mature	theory	of	mind	(Apperly	&	Butterfill,	2009;	Goldman,	2000),	the	extent	to	which	theory	of	mind	relies	on	self	knowledge	(Carruthers,	2011;	Goldman,	2006;	Gordon,	1995),	the	explanation	of	pretense	(Carruthers,	2006;	Nichols	&	Stich,	2000),	and	a	host	of	other	related	behaviors.	Each	of	these	debates	is	about	the	cognitive	processes	that	make	successful,	accurate	mindreading	possible.		Mindreading	is	an	impressive	and	incredibly	useful	ability.	Given	how	different	each	person’s	experiences	are	and	how	complex	the	social	world	is,	it	is	remarkable	that	we	ever	generate	similar	and	accurate	mentalistic	explanations	and	predictions	of	behavior.	Thus,	it	is	natural	to	frame	the	investigation	of	mindreading	around	explaining	this	impressive	feat,	as	the	theory	of	mind	literature	has.	However,	given	this	way	of	framing	the	investigation	of	mindreading,	these	debates	rarely	focus	on	individual	differences	in	mindreading.	Indeed,	even	outsiders’	critiques	of	the	theory	of	mind	literature	do	not	address	the	kinds	of	disagreements	that	are	common	in	our	everyday	lives	(Gallagher,	2005;	Hutto,	2008).	As	a	result,	individuals’	deep	disagreements	about	the	interpretation	of	social	interactions	simply	do	not	come	up	in	these	discussions.	This,	I	shall	argue	below,	is	a	serious	
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problem.	These	disagreements	reveal	that	philosophers	have	missed	important	facts	about	how	mindreading	works.		Social	psychologists	have	investigated	how	such	disagreements	arise,5	and	yet	philosophers	have	paid	little	attention	to	this.	The	phenomena	studied	by	social	psychologists	clearly	are	relevant	to	when,	how,	and	what	mental	states	we	attribute	to	others.	For	example,	categorizing	people	as	part	of	our	in-group	or	part	of	an	out-group	affects	the	extent	to	which	we	attribute	to	them	secondary	emotions	and	complex	mental	states.	When	we	judge	someone	to	be	different	from	us,	e.g.,	someone	who	has	a	different	race,	age,	and	socioeconomic	status,	we	tend	to	attribute	simpler,	baser	motives	and	emotions	to	that	person.	However,	when	we	judge	someone	to	be	similar	to	us,	e.g.,	someone	who	shares	our	race,	age,	and	socioeconomic	status,	we	usually	do	not	to	caricature	this	person’s	mental	states.	Instead,	we	tend	to	project	our	own	motivations,	emotions,	and	beliefs	to	that	person.	Perceived	similarity	plays	an	important	role	in	how	we	understand	others.6	
																																																								5	In	a	foundational	study	on	this	topic,	Hastorf	and	Cantril	(1954)	found	that	students	from	rival	universities	interpreted	a	video	of	a	football	game	between	the	rivals	dramatically	differently.	Disagreements	emerged	over	whether	the	game	was	played	fairly,	which	team	played	dirty,	whether	particular	charges	were	justified,	whether	a	non-call	was	justified,	the	proportion	of	infractions	the	other	team	made,	etc.	As	any	sports	fan	knows,	one’s	allegiance	to	a	team	colors	one’s	interpretation	of	what	happens	in	the	game.	For	excellent	contemporary	social	psychology	research,	see	Bertram	Malle	(2004),	Daniel	Ames	(2004a),	Susan	Fiske	and	colleagues	(2005),	Nicholas	Epley	and	Adam	Waytz	(2010),	John	Barresi	(2004),	and	Jay	Van	Bavel	and	colleagues	(2014).	Not	all	of	these	are	disagreements	are	about	mental	states	–	some	are	simply	disagreements	about	the	facts	–	but	many	of	the	disagreements	are	about	mental	states,	e.g.,	whether	the	referees	are	biased	and	whether	an	interaction	was	incidental	contact	or	targeting.		6	Though	it	is	presented	in	different	terms,	this	is	one	reason	why	civil	rights	advocates	urge	that	police	departments’	racial	makeup	be	similar	to	the	communities	they	police.		
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Thus,	the	phenomena	studied	by	social	psychology	clearly	are	relevant	to	philosophical	discussions	of	mindreading.	Philosophers	do	not	systematically	examine	how	these	social	psychology	findings	bear	on	theory	of	mind.7	These	data	play	almost	no	role	in	constraining	our	accounts	of	how	we	understand	other	people.	The	participants	in	the	various	philosophical	debates	described	above	rarely,	if	at	all,	discuss	these	data	and	how	they	influence	mindreading.	Presumably	this	segregation	between	theory	of	mind	and	social	psychological	phenomena	began	as	a	benign	simplification.	In	order	to	build	a	theory	of	how	we	attribute	mental	states,	theorists	have	to	abstract	away	from	some	of	the	messy	empirical	details.	But	the	field	has	advanced	dramatically,	and	accounts	of	theory	of	mind	aim	to	explain	the	subtle	details	of	real-life,	complex	human	social	behavior.	For	example,	philosophical	debates	concern	the	real	life	conditions	under	which	we	confabulate	(Carruthers,	2009),	children’s	successes	and	failures	in	figuring	out	when	someone	is	pretending	(Nichols	&	Stich,	2000),	the	idiosyncratic	mindreading	mistakes	of	people	with	autism	(McGeer,	2001),	etc.	Thus,	philosophical	discussions	of	mindreading	nowadays	focus	on	the	messy	empirical	details,	but	they	neglect	the	deep	mindreading	disagreements	common	among	neurotypical	adults.	I	aim	to	rectify	this	mistake	in	this	paper.	The	next	sections	discuss	two	phenomena	in	social	psychology:	social	categorization	and	the	goals	and	corresponding	approaches	in	social	interaction.	I																																																									7	Perhaps	one	reason	for	this	is	that	social	psychologists	often	are	interested	in	global	character	traits	whereas	philosophers	studying	mindreading	are	interested	in	our	ability	to	infer	specific	propositional	attitudes.	However,	as	I	argue	in	the	main	text,	these	social	psychological	phenomena	are	highly	relevant	to	how	we	infer	specific	propositional	attitudes.	Thanks	to	a	reviewer	for	pointing	out	this	difference	between	the	two	literatures.			
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shall	argue	that	these	phenomena	affect	both	the	input	and	processing	of	mindreading.	Specifically,	social	categorization	clarifies	how	we	narrow	down	the	available	social	information	and,	as	a	result,	the	sort	of	information	that	serves	as	input	for	mindreading.	The	goals	and	approaches	of	social	interaction	reveal	the	mindreading	processes	we	employ	under	various	conditions.	These	findings	are	crucial	for	understanding	when,	how,	and	what	mental	states	we	attribute	to	others,	and	thus	any	adequate	account	of	how	we	understand	others	must	take	them	into	consideration.		
3.	Social	Categorization			Social	categorization	–	sorting	people,	behaviors,	and	events	into	social	categories	–	is	essential	for	successful	navigation	of	the	social	world.	It	helps	make	the	social	world	more	comprehensible	and	predictable,	and	thereby	allows	us	to	manipulate	the	social	world	for	our	purposes.	We	would	be	hopelessly	lost	without	the	ability	to	detect	patterns	and	categorize	people,	situations,	and	events.		In	social	interactions,	we	reflexively	and	rapidly	sort	people	into	categories.	For	example,	within	100	milliseconds	of	seeing	a	face,	we	can	sort	people	by	age,	gender,	and	race	(Ito,	Thompson,	&	Cacioppo,	2004;	Liu,	Harris,	&	Kanwisher,	2002).	We	tend	to	sort	people	by	the	most	salient	category,	and	age,	gender,	and	race	often	are	the	most	salient	categories.8	However,	the	categories	we	employ	can	be																																																									8	Race	is	salient	in	multicultural	societies.	However,	in	a	racially	uniform	society	in	which	one	never	encounters	a	person	of	another	race,	race	would	not	be	a	salient	social	category.			
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modulated	by	cognitive	load,	task,	and	context	(Gilbert	&	Hixon,	1991;	Wheeler	&	Fiske,	2005).	Context,	cognitive	load,	and	our	goals	influence	what	is	salient	to	us,	and	what	is	salient	determines	which	social	categories	we	employ	when	we	reflexively	sort	people	into	social	groups.	Thus,	social	categories	are	activated	reflexively,	but	which	ones	are	activated	depends	on	the	context.9	On	the	basis	of	rapid	facial	recognition,	we	spontaneously	infer	personality	traits,	as	well,	e.g.,	trustworthiness,	competence,	aggressiveness,	dominance	(Olivola	&	Todorov,	2010;	Rule,	Ambady,	&	Adams	Jr,	2009).	Of	course	these	may	be	inaccurate	inferences.	Nevertheless,	we	do	make	these	inferences,	and	we	do	so	very	quickly	even	when	we	are	under	cognitive	load.	(Malle	&	Holbrook,	2012;	Todorov	&	Uleman,	2003).10	Inferences	about	personality	traits	play	an	important	role	in	the	mental	states	we	attribute	to	people	and	our	interpretation	of	their	behavior.	The	categories	we	use	to	sort	people	are	associated	implicitly	with	specific	characteristics.	For	example,	we	associate	old	and	incompetent,	female	and	warm,																																																									9	Social	psychologists	call	social	categorization	conditionally	automatic	(Macrae	&	Bodenhausen,	2000).	The	term	“automatic”	often	invites	confusion	because	people	use	it	many	different	ways.	In	this	context,	automatic	means	reflexive	or	spontaneous.	It	does	not	mean	fast,	innate,	subconscious,	etc.	Thus,	social	categorization	is	automatic	in	the	sense	that	it	is	reflexive,	and	it	is	conditionally	automatic	in	the	sense	that	the	categories	we	employ	are	conditional	on	the	context.	So-called	conditionally	automatic	social	categorization	is	compatible	with	sorting	by	some	categories	faster	than	others	–	indeed,	the	evidence	is	that	we	sort	faces	by	age,	race,	and	gender	faster	than	other	categories.	It	is	also	compatible	with	it	taking	longer	for	us	to	process	the	entire	stereotype	associated	with	a	category	than	it	takes	to	sort	people	into	basic	categories	like	age,	race,	and	gender.	Thanks	to	a	reviewer	for	pushing	me	to	clarify	these	issues.	10	The	speed	of	spontaneous	trait	inferences	is	a	disputed	matter.	For	example,	Todorov	and	Uleman	(2003)	report	that	spontaneous	trait	inferences	occur	as	quickly	as	100	milliseconds	after	exposure	to	a	face.	In	contrast,	Malle	and	Holbrook	(2012)	find	that	spontaneous	trait	inferences	occur	within	1400	to	1600	milliseconds,	depending	on	the	task	and	type	of	stimulus.	In	either	case,	spontaneous	personality	trait	inferences	occur	very	rapidly	in	social	interactions.	
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baby-face	and	unthreatening.	These	associations	are	the	sort	of	thing	probed	by	the	Implicit	Association	Task	(IAT)	(Greenwald,	McGhee,	&	Schwartz,	1998;	Greenwald,	Poehlman,	Uhlmann,	&	Banaji,	2009).	IAT	measures	how	quickly	and	accurately	subjects	categorize	stereotypic	and	counter-stereotypic	associations,	e.g.,	Black	::	gun,	White	::	cellphone	vs.	Black	::	cellphone,	White	::	gun.	The	task	measures	the	strength	of	a	person’s	implicit	associations.11		In	addition	to	–	and	on	the	basis	of	–	social	categorization	and	personality	trait	inferences,	we	quickly	identify	people	as	part	of	our	in-group	or	as	part	of	an	out-group	(Tajfel,	1974).	In-grouping	and	out-grouping	appear	to	be	a	function	of	perceived	similarity	(Ames,	2004a,	2004b).	That	is,	those	who	we	judge	to	be	like	us	are	categorized	as	part	of	in	our	in-group,	and	those	who	we	judge	to	be	unlike	us	are	categorized	as	part	of	an	out-group.	Perceived	similarity	is	a	subjective,	contextually	relative,	and	sometimes	idiosyncratic	judgment,	not	an	objective	measure	of	actual	similarity.	In	heterogeneous	societies,	age,	race,	and	gender	are	salient	features	of	people,	and	thus	one	tends	to	identify	people	who	share	one’s	age,	race,	or	gender	as	part	of	one’s	in-group.	However,	social	categorization	extends	beyond	these	classifications.	People	have	multiple,	overlapping	identities,	and	perceived	similarity																																																									11	There	is	no	consensus	on	how	to	interpret	what	IAT	and	other	such	tasks	are	measuring.	Some	philosophers	interpret	IAT	and	other	such	tasks	as	measuring	of	our	implicit	attitudes,	e.g.,	Gendler	(2008)	and	(Mandelbaum,	2015).	On	that	interpretation,	IAT	reveals	that	despite	explicit	egalitarian	attitudes	toward	Blacks	and	Whites,	many	White	people	have	implicit	White	supremacist	attitudes.	In	contrast,	Levy	(2014)	argues	that	IAT	measures	our	patchy	endorsements,	which	is	something	more	fragmented	than	ordinary	beliefs.	Machery	(2016)	offers	an	alternative	interpretation	according	to	which	IAT	and	other	such	tasks	measure	
traits	rather	than	attitudes.	See	Del	Pinal	and	Spaulding	(in	progress)	for	an	alternative	interpretation	of	what	IAT	and	other	implicit	bias	tasks	are	measuring.	
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is	relative	to	a	context.	Who	counts	as	part	of	one’s	in-group	varies	depending	on	the	social	context.	For	example,	in	a	context	where	hobbies	are	salient,	only	runners	count	as	part	of	my	in-group,	and	non-runners	are	the	out-group.	However,	when	political	views	are	salient,	only	liberals	are	part	of	my	in-group.	In	this	context,	both	runners	and	non-runners	may	be	categorized	as	part	of	my	political	in-group.	Moreover,	in	categorizing	individuals	into	in-groups	and	out-groups,	we	gloss	over	differences	within	the	groups	and	exaggerate	differences	between	the	groups	(Linville,	Fischer,	&	Salovey,	1989;	Mullen	&	Hu,	1989).	Thus,	my	runner	friends	may	not	be	as	similar,	to	me	and	to	each	other,	as	I	assume,	and	my	runner	and	non-runner	friends	may	not	be	so	different	as	I	assume.	These	patterns	are	interesting	in	and	of	themselves,	but	they	are	important	in	this	discussion	because	we	treat	in-group	members	quite	differently	from	out-group	members.	We	usually	have	more	favorable	attitudes	toward	and	empathize	more	with	in-group	members,	especially	people	who	share	our	gender,	race,	age,	religion,	or	nationality	than	toward	people	do	not	share	these	features	(Rudman,	Greenwald,	Mellott,	&	Schwartz,	1999).	By	making	idiosyncratic	features	artificially	salient,	experimenters	can	elicit	in-group	favoritism	even	for	very	minimal,	arbitrary	groups	(Ashburn-Nardo,	Voils,	&	Monteith,	2001).	The	effects	of	in-group	favoritism	especially	are	strong	in	a	context	of	competition	or	threat	(Cikara,	Bruneau,	Van	Bavel,	&	Saxe,	2014).	More	troublingly,	we	regard	in-group	members	as	more	human,	in	a	sense,	than	out-group	members	(Hackel	et	al.,	2014).	We	regard	them	as	more	capable	of	experiencing	secondary	emotions	(such	as	pride	and	guilt)	and	as	having	richer,	
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more	complex	mental	experiences	than	out-group	members	(Haslam,	2006).	We	tend	to	attribute	more	simplistic,	caricatured	mental	states	to	those	we	perceive	to	be	unlike	us.	At	the	extreme,	people	tend	to	dehumanize	those	individuals	who	are	perceived	to	be	least	like	them,	e.g.,	the	homeless	and	drug	addicts	(Harris	&	Fiske,	2006).		In	sum,	social	categorization	influences	our	interpretation	of	others’	behaviors,	personality	traits,	and	our	expectations	of	what	they	will	do	next.	On	the	basis	of	perceived	similarity,	we	judge	others	as	part	of	an	in-group	or	an	out-group,	and	in-group/out-group	status	significantly	affects	when,	how,	and	what	mental	states	we	attribute	to	others.	Individuals	from	different	social	backgrounds	will	tend	to	have	different	implicit	associations,	spontaneous	personality	trait	inferences,	and	judgments	of	perceived	similarity,	which	will	result	different	patterns	of	social	categorization.	These	patterns	of	social	categorization	can	be	modulated	but	only	if	one	is	aware	of	the	patterns	and	their	effect	and	one	has	sufficient	cognitive	resources	to	detect	and	revise	these	inferences	and	judgments.	This	discussion	of	social	categorization	demonstrates	how	our	social	differences	influence	our	social	interpretations.		
4.	Goals	and	Approaches	in	Social	Interaction		We	have	various	goals	in	social	interactions.	The	following	is	not	an	exhaustive	list,	but	it	covers	several	of	the	most	common	goals.	Sometimes	we	aim	for	accuracy,	especially	when	something	important	depends	on	getting	it	right,	when	we	will	be	
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held	responsible	for	our	interpretation	of	the	interaction,	or	when	the	situation	is	unusual	and	unexpected	(Fiske	&	Neuberg,	1990;	Kelley,	1973;	Tetlock,	1992).	However,	often	times	we	aim	for	efficiency	primarily	and	accuracy	only	secondarily.	When	the	social	interaction	seems	ordinary	and	familiar,	when	not	much	hangs	on	it,	or	when	we	are	otherwise	cognitively	taxed,	we	use	cognitive	shortcuts,	e.g.,	stereotypes	and	projection	(Fiske	&	Taylor,	2013,	pp.	177-199).	Another	cluster	of	goals	within	social	interaction	includes	anxiety	reduction,	self-esteem,	and	confirmation	of	one’s	worldview.	In	these	cases,	our	inferences,	in	one	way	or	another,	serve	self-interested	purposes	(Dunning,	1999;	Kunda,	1990).	These	three	goals	are	not	mutually	exclusive	or	exhaustive.	We	have,	to	varying	degrees,	each	of	these	goals	with	respect	to	different	aspects	of	a	social	interaction.	Moreover,	our	goals	can	change	within	a	social	interaction,	and	there	can	be	tradeoffs	among	these	different	goals.	In	what	follows,	I	shall	address	these	goals	as	distinct	perspectives	for	simplicity	and	ease	of	explication,	but	this	is	just	a	theoretical	simplification.	In	real	social	interactions,	these	goals	dynamically	interact	with	each	other.	Corresponding	to	this	array	of	goals	are	various	approaches	for	social	interpretation.12	With	the	goal	of	accuracy,	we	tend	to	search	for	relevant																																																									12	An	approach	for	social	interpretation	is	like	a	strategy	that	need	not	be	conscious	or	deliberate.		Each	of	these	goals	and	corresponding	approaches	may	be	conscious	or	non-conscious.	Like	the	goals	that	they	correspond	to,	these	approaches	are	not	mutually	exclusive.	Social	interactions	often	are	complex	diachronic	events,	and	we	may	adopt	multiple	mindreading	approaches	when	interpreting	a	social	interaction.	Many	mindreading	episodes	involve	some	deliberation	(for	salient	aspects	of	the	situation	that	we	want	to	get	right),	heuristics	(for	aspects	of	the	situation	that	seem	familiar	or	unimportant	to	us),	and	self-interested	biases	(for	aspects	of	the	situation	that	may	threaten	our	self-image	or	ideology).	Moreover,	these	approaches	may	interact	in	the	sense	that	self-interested	biases	influence	our	careful	deliberation,	heuristics	inform	and	influence	the	judgments	we	make	when	
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information	in	a	controlled	and	deliberative	fashion.	For	example,	when	members	of	a	job	search	committee	make	judgments	about	the	candidates	(e.g.,	who	will	be	a	friendly	colleague,	who	will	be	willing	to	serve	on	committees,	who	will	want	to	stay	for	the	long	term),	the	stakes	are	high.	Thoughtful	members	of	the	committee	will	want	to	ensure	that	their	judgments	are	accurate,	consider	all	the	relevant	evidence,	and	make	sure	their	decision	is	not	based	on	merely	superficial	cues.	This	kind	of	reasoning	is	effortful,	cognitively	taxing,	and	difficult	if	one	is	under	cognitive	load	or	not	well	practiced	in	this	kind	of	reflective	reasoning	(Gilbert,	Krull,	&	Pelham,	1988).		When	aiming	for	efficiency,	there	are	several	approaches	to	social	interpretation.	For	example,	when	we	perceive	an	individual	to	be	similar	to	us	in	some	salient	respect,	we	often	simply	project	our	own	mental	states	to	that	individual	(Ames,	2004a,	2004b).	We	also	use	our	mental	states	as	an	anchor	and	adjust	the	interpretation	based	on	how	similar	the	individual	is	to	us.	These	are	egocentric	heuristics.	They	generate	the	“curse	of	knowledge,”	a	phenomenon	wherein	we	falsely	assume	that	others	know	what	we	know,	and	the	“false	consensus	effect,”	which	occurs	when	we	falsely	assume	that	others	share	our	opinion	on	some	matter	(Clement	&	Krueger,	2002;	Epley	&	Waytz,	2010,	p.	512).		When	we	perceive	an	individual	to	be	different	from	us,	we	tend	to	take	alternative	efficient	approaches.	Often	we	use	stereotypes	about	the	individual’s	salient	in-group	(Ames,	2004a;	Krueger,	1998;	Vorauer,	Hunter,	Main,	&	Roy,	2000).	Stereotypes	may	be	positive,	negative,	or	neutral	beliefs	about	some	group.	These																																																																																																																																																																						deliberating,	and	careful	deliberation	may	correct	the	heuristics	we	use	and	combat	the	pull	of	self-interested	biases.		
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are	efficient	approaches	because	they	rely	on	long-term	memory	rather	than	working	memory,	which	is	quite	limited	and	already	taxed	by	other	online	processes	(Baddeley,	2012).	Reliance	on	stereotypes	is	a	shortcut	that	reduces	cognitive	load.	Moreover,	once	the	stereotype	is	activated,	processing	stereotype-consistent	information	is	less	cognitively	demanding	than	processing	stereotype-inconsistent	information.	When	subjects	are	under	cognitive	load,	they	will	use	the	most	efficient	approaches,	e.g.,	employing	a	stereotype	and	attending	to	stereotype-inconsistent	information	only	if	it	is	highly	salient	(Gilbert	&	Hixon,	1991).	We	tend	to	use	efficient	approaches	like	stereotyping	and	projection	when	we	are	in	very	familiar	situations.	As	particular	situations	become	more	familiar	to	us,	the	interpretation	of	those	situations	will	become	more	accessible	and	more	difficult	to	override	(Higgins,	King,	&	Mavin,	1982).	The	tendency	to	habitually	code	situations	and	others’	behavior	in	a	particular	way	can	become	proceduralized.	Well-practiced	judgments	make	social	interpretation	easier,	more	efficient,	and	more	predictable,	but	they	preempt	equally	reasonable	but	less	practiced	judgments	(Smith,	1990).	Thus,	in	very	familiar	situations	it	may	be	difficult	for	people	not	to	employ	particular	stereotypes	or	project	their	own	perspective.	The	two	previous	types	of	approaches	differ	with	respect	to	how	effortful	they	are.	The	approaches	we	take	when	we	have	self-serving	goals	may	be	effortful	or	efficient.	Consider	first	the	Self-Serving	Attributional	Bias,	which	describes	our	tendency	to	take	credit	for	success	and	deny	responsibility	for	failure.	(Miller	&	Ross,	
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1975).13	For	example,	we	often	attribute	our	successes	to	some	internal	factor,	e.g.,	diligence	or	talent,	and	attribute	our	failures	to	external	mitigating	factors,	e.g.,	bad	luck	or	bias.	In	this	way,	we	come	to	feel	good	about	our	successes	and	brush	off	our	failures.		This	is	relevant	to	social	interpretation	because	this	pattern	is	found	for	judging	in-group	and	out-group	behaviors,	as	well.	This	is	called	the	Group-Serving	Attributional	Bias	(Brewer	&	Brown,	1998;	Pettigrew,	1979).	One	tends	to	judge	the	success	of	an	out-group	to	be	the	result	of	situational	factors	and	the	failure	of	an	out-group	as	the	result	of	internal	factors,	whereas	one	judges	the	success	of	one’s	in-group	to	be	the	result	of	internal	factors	and	the	failure	of	one’s	in-group	to	be	the	result	of	situational	factors.	This	pattern	is	very	clear	in	sports	fans.	When	my	sports	team	wins	it	is	because	they	are	talented	and	hard	working,	but	when	my	sports	team	loses	it	is	because	they	were	off	their	game,	the	other	team	got	lucky,	and	the	referees	were	biased	against	my	team.	One	explains	a	target’s	behavior	differently	depending	on	whether	the	target	is	part	of	one’s	in-group	or	an	out-group.	Another	approach	corresponding	to	self-serving	goals	is	called	Naïve	Realism.	It	describes	the	tendency	to	regard	others	as	more	susceptible	to	bias	and	misperception	than	oneself	(Pronin,	Lin,	&	Ross,	2002).	We	think	we	simply	see																																																									13	The	Self-Serving	Attributional	Bias	is	distinct	from	the	Actor-Observer	Effect,	which	holds	that	people	explain	others’	behavior	in	terms	of	dispositional	factors	and	their	own	in	terms	of	situational	factors.	In	other	words,	behavioral	explanations	differ	depending	on	whether	one	is	the	actor	or	the	observer.	The	empirical	evidence	for	this	effect	is	mixed	(Malle,	2006),	but	see	Malle,	Knobe,	and	Nelson	(2007)	for	a	novel	interpretation	of	the	asymmetries	in	patterns	of	explanation.	
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things	as	they	are,	but	others	suffer	from	bias.	This	tendency	is	prevalent	in	interactions	in	which	people	disagree,	e.g.,	political	debates.	One	tends	to	regard	those	of	a	different	political	party	as	likely	to	be	misguided	and	biased	by	their	personal	motivations,	whereas	one	regards	oneself	(and	to	some	extent	other	members	of	one’s	political	party)	simply	as	correct.	This	self-serving	approach	influences	how	we	interpret	others’	mental	states	and	behavior,	especially	out-group	members	who	disagree	with	us	about	some	salient	issue.		Finally,	confirmation	bias	describes	a	general	tendency	to	consider	only	information	that	confirms	one’s	preconceived	ideas,	prior	knowledge,	and	relevant	expertise	and	interpret	ambiguous	information	in	light	of	this	prior	information.	With	respect	to	social	cognition,	we	have	preconceived	ideas,	prior	knowledge,	and	some	expertise	about	other	individuals	and	groups,	and	we	tend	to	interpret	social	interactions	in	terms	of	this	prior	information.	For	example,	racists	notice	when	individuals	behave	in	ways	that	confirm	their	racist	beliefs	but	they	often	do	not	attend	to	the	many	cases	in	which	individuals	act	in	ways	that	disconfirm	their	racist	beliefs.	Confirmation	bias	affects	both	deliberative,	controlled	processes	and	efficient	processes	like	stereotyping.	It	occurs	regardless	of	how	the	prior	information	originated,	how	likely	it	is	to	be	true,	and	whether	accuracy	is	incentivized	(Skov	&	Sherman,	1986;	Slowiaczek,	Klayman,	Sherman,	&	Skov,	1992;	Snyder,	Campbell,	&	Preston,	1982).		Sometimes,	of	course,	information	glaringly	contradicts	our	preconceived	ideas	and	we	have	to	reconcile	the	information	with	our	ideas.	However,	social	interactions	can	be	ambiguous,	and	the	interpretation	of	these	ambiguous	
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interactions	differs	greatly	by	individuals	who	have	radically	different	preconceived	ideas.	Thus,	when	we	are	called	to	interpret	an	ambiguous	social	interaction,	we	tend	to	consider	only	information	that	confirms	our	ideas.	The	result	is	consistent	validation	of	one’s	worldview.		In	summary,	the	various	goals	we	have	in	social	interactions	determine	the	various	approaches	we	take	to	understand	other	people.	Sometimes	we	have	the	motivation	and	ability	to	exhaustively	review	the	available	social	information	and	attribute	mental	states	to	others	in	that	way.	Other	times	we	take	shortcuts	because	we	lack	the	motivation	or	ability	to	do	an	exhaustive	search.	The	shortcuts	we	take	partly	are	a	function	of	social	categorization:	we	are	more	likely	to	project	our	own	mental	states	on	those	we	perceive	to	be	similar	to	us	and	stereotype	those	we	perceive	to	be	different	from	us.	In	addition,	many	of	our	social	interpretations	are	guided	by	self-interest,	and	as	a	result	we	interpret	others’	behavior	and	mental	states	in	light	of	what	we	antecedently	believe	or	want	to	believe.	Thus,	our	interpretation	of	a	social	interaction	is	influenced	by	our	goals	and	whether	the	interaction	involves	in-group	or	out-group	members.	It	is	important	to	note	again	that	these	approaches	are	not	mutually	exclusive	and	often	co-occur	in	an	episode	of	social	interpretation.	Deliberation	can	influence	and	be	influenced	by	heuristics	and	self-interested	biases.	One	can	start	see	how	two	people	who	differ	in	their	goals	and	judgments	of	perceived	similarity	might	come	away	with	profoundly	different	interpretations	of	the	same	evidence.			
5.	Implications	for	Mindreading	
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	The	literature	on	how	we	understand	others	started	in	earnest	nearly	40	years	ago	with	the	publication	of	Premack	and	Woodruff’s	(1978)	seminal	article	on	theory	of	mind.	Since	then,	research	on	theory	of	mind	has	flourished	in	developmental	and	comparative	psychology,	linguistics,	cognitive	neuroscience,	and	philosophy.	Above	I	described	just	a	few	of	the	many	ongoing	philosophical	debates	about	how	we	understand	others’	minds	and	behavior.	These	debates	generally	embrace	the	nuanced	empirical	details	about	how	mindreading	operates,	but	the	social	psychological	phenomena	discussed	above	strangely	are	left	out	of	these	discussions.14		In	the	philosophy	literature,	the	two	most	authoritative	books	on	theory	of	mind	are	Shaun	Nichols	and	Stephen	Stich’s	(2003)	Mindreading	and	Alvin	Goldman’s	(2006)	Simulating	Minds.	Nichols	and	Stich	do	not	discuss	any	of	these	social	psychology	findings	in	their	book.	Goldman	discusses	only	egocentric	biases	(as	evidence	that	we	use	our	own	minds	to	simulate	others).	In	these	two	pillars	of	the	literature,	there	is	no	systematic	discussion	of	the	ways	in	which	social	categorization	and	goals	and	approaches	of	social	interactions.	These	books	are	not	alone	in	neglecting	the	way	in	which	these	phenomena	constrain	and	distort	mindreading;	the	field	as	a	whole	overlooks	these	findings.15																																																											14	Developmental	psychologists	working	in	theory	of	mind	face	this	same	lacuna	(Apperly,	2012;	Rakoczy,	2014).	For	example,	Ian	Apperly,	writes,	“although	it	has	long	been	recognized	in	principle	that	there	should	be	important	links	between	ToM	and	research	on	social	psychology,	reasoning,	and	experimental	pragmatics,	these	literatures	have	seldom	meshed	well	in	practice”	(2012,	p.	837).		15	See,	for	example,	Carruthers	(2011);	Carruthers	and	Smith	(1996);	Davies	and	Stone	(1995a,	1995b);	Gordon	(2009);	Ravenscroft	(2010).		
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This	fact	is	puzzling	because	the	social	psychological	phenomena	discussed	in	the	previous	sections	have	significant	implications	for	how	we	attribute	mental	states	to	others	in	order	to	understand	their	behavior.	Specifically,	two	factors	determine	the	output	of	our	mindreading	processes:	the	input	and	the	processing.16	Social	categorization	influences	the	input	to	mindreading,	and	our	goals	and	approaches	influence	how	we	process	this	input.	These	findings	are	directly	relevant	to	debates	about	how	mindreading	is	achieved.	I	address	input	in	the	next	section	and	processing	in	the	following	section.		
5.1	Mindreading	Input		In	complex,	dynamic	social	situations,	the	amount	of	available	information	is	enormous.	There	is	too	much	information	for	human	beings	to	process,	and	we	attend	to	only	a	tiny	portion	of	that	information.	Furthermore,	social	situations	can	be	ambiguous,	especially	when	they	involve	people	outside	one’s	close	circle	of	family	and	friends.	Sometimes	this	ambiguity	is	superficial	insofar	as	one	is	not	in	a	position	to	know	the	correct	interpretation	but	with	sufficient	investigation	could	figure	it	out.	Other	times,	however,	the	ambiguity	is	deep	in	the	sense	that	one	simply	cannot	know	the	right	interpretation.																																																									16	In	what	follows,	I	draw	broadly	on	Nicholas	Epley’s	framework	(2008),	which	holds	that	the	accuracy	of	our	mindreading	attributions	depends	on	what	we	take	as	input	and	how	we	process	that	information.	One	difference	between	his	framework	and	mine	is	that	he	argues	that	we	tend	to	reason	about	others’	mental	states	by	reasoning	about	our	own	mental	states	first,	and	this	serves	as	an	anchor	that	we	may	subsequently	adjust	with	deliberation.	In	contrast,	I	argue	that	when	we	perceive	others	to	be	different	from	ourselves,	we	tend	not	to	use	an	egocentric	anchor.	In	such	cases,	we	rely	on	our	stereotypes	of	members	of	that	out-group.	
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The	abundance	of	information	and	ambiguity	of	social	situations	highlight	the	fact	that	one	does	not	simply	read	off	the	social	facts	from	the	environment.	We	take	as	input	some	subset	of	the	available	information	and	base	mental	state	attributions	on	this	information.	If	we	want	to	given	a	complete	account	of	how	we	attribute	mental	states,	we	have	to	understand	which	information	is	taken	as	input	for	mindreading.		There	are	some	universal	patterns	regarding	what	is	salient	to	us,	e.g.,	biological	movement	and	faces	are	especially	salient.	But	we	attend	to	more	than	just	biological	movement	and	faces.	We	also	attend	to	social	features.	The	social	features	that	are	salient	to	us	depend	on	our	situation,	expectations,	and	goals	(Fiske	&	Taylor,	2013,	pp.	66-68).	And	it	is	here	that	the	data	from	social	psychology	are	relevant.	Social	categorization	is	especially	important	for	understanding	what	gets	taken	as	input	for	mindreading.	Studies	on	social	categorization	reveal	that	we	spontaneously	and	rapidly	sort	people	by	the	most	salient	features,	usually	gender,	age,	and	race.	Social	categories	involve	implicit	associations,	e.g.,	old	and	incompetent,	female	and	warm.	Thus,	social	categories	and	the	features	we	implicitly	associate	with	these	categories	are	salient	to	us	and	hence	can	serve	as	input	to	mindreading.	In	other	words,	these	features	are	the	basis	for	mental	state	attributions,	which	we	tend	to	use	to	interpret	and	anticipate	others’	behavior.17		
																																																								17	Social	categorization	may	shape	the	inputs	to	mindreading,	as	I	argue	in	this	section.	However,	social	categorization	may	also	run	in	parallel	with	mindreading,	and	in	some	cases	social	categorization	and	mindreading	may	influence	each	other.	In	the	latter	case,	mindreading	a	target	may	cause	us	to	re-categorize	a	target.	In	this	
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We	do	not	regard	all	individuals	as	the	same.	Rather,	on	the	basis	of	perceived	similarity,	which	is	relative	to	a	context,	we	spontaneously	and	rapidly	classify	individuals	as	like-us	or	not	like-us.	When	we	sort	people	into	in-groups	or	out-groups,	we	tend	to	ignore	heterogeneity	within	groups	and	exaggerate	differences	between	groups.	In	other	words,	we	attend	to	the	features	that	mark	an	individual	as	part	of	an	in-group	or	out-group	in	a	certain	context.	These	features	are	salient	and	serve	as	input	for	mindreading.		In	addition	to	social	categories	and	group	status,	we	also	attend	to	others’	behaviors.	But	we	do	not	simply	read	off	the	meaning	of	others’	behaviors	from	the	world.	Behavior	interpretation	is	modulated	by	the	situational	context.	Whether	we	evaluate	behavior	as	normal,	funny,	aggressive,	or	rude	depends	on	the	situational	context.	On	the	basis	of	behavior	evaluation,	we	infer	individuals’	personality	traits,	e.g.,	friendly,	pretentious,	or	cheerful.	The	features	of	a	situation	that	we	notice	are	a	function	of	the	situational	context,	which	makes	certain	interpretations	more	accessible	to	us.	Thus,	to	understand	the	input	to	mindreading,	one	has	to	understand	how	the	situational	context	modulates	behavior	evaluation,	personality	trait	inferences,	and	accessible	interpretations.18	Social	categorization	sheds	light	on	some	of	the	ways	in	which	we	narrow	down	the	available	social	information	and,	as	a	result,	the	sort	of	information	that	serves	as	input	for	mindreading.	Philosophical	discussions	of	theory	of	mind	tend	to	focus	on	what	is	common	among	everyone’s	mindreading	processes,	but	in	doing	so																																																																																																																																																																						kind	of	case,	mindreading	serves	as	a	corrective	for	our	categorizing.	Thanks	to	a	reviewer	for	pointing	out	this	possibility.			18	For	more	on	how	the	situational	context	modulates	our	social	interpretations,	see	Spaulding	(2017).	
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these	discussions	miss	out	on	interesting,	important,	and	dramatic	differences.	We	do	not	all	attend	to	the	same	features	of	a	social	interaction,	nor	do	we	interpret	these	features	in	the	same	way.	Our	subjective	sense	of	perceived	similarity	to	others	in	the	social	interaction,	implicit	associations,	and	situational	context	influence	the	features,	concepts,	and	interpretations	that	are	to	salient	to	us.	Individuals	who	differ	in	their	social	characteristics	will	tend	to	take	different	information	as	input	to	mindreading,	and	as	a	result	they	will	tend	to	generate	different	social	interpretations.	This	is	not	simply	a	matter	of	a	theoretical	discussion	not	capturing	the	messy,	empirical	details.	Individuals	with	different	social	backgrounds	generate	different	mindreading	judgments	in	predictable	ways,	and	the	mindreading	literature	simply	fails	to	detect	these	patterns	and	the	disagreements	they	generate.	This	discussion	highlights	the	fact	that	even	if	two	people	are	looking	at	the	same	video,	if	the	individuals	differ	with	respect	to	these	social	psychological	phenomena	they	will	tend	to	interpret	the	situation	very	differently.	How	one	individual	interprets	an	event	will	be	quite	different	from	how	the	other	person	interprets	it.	This	is	dramatically	evinced	by	the	divergent	interpretations	of	the	Garner	video.	Though	it	is	difficult	to	say	with	any	precision	exactly	what	features	of	a	situation	two	particular	individuals	are	taking	as	input	for	mindreading,	we	can	take	the	disagreement	reported	on	This	American	Life	as	a	schematic	example	of	how	such	disagreements	arise.	The	producer	for	This	American	Life	likely	identifies	with	Garner	as	part	of	her	racial	in-group,	whereas	the	police	officer	likely	identifies	with	the	other	police	offers	as	part	of	her	in-group.	As	explained	above,	this	
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subjective	sense	of	perceived	similarity	influences	how	one	sees	and	interprets	a	target’s	behavior.	Furthermore,	the	past	experiences	and	narratives	familiar	to	the	producer	and	the	police	officer	likely	differ,	so	they	will	notice	different	features	of	the	situation	and	interpret	those	features	in	light	of	narratives	familiar	to	them.	Though	the	producer	and	police	officer	are	looking	at	the	same	interaction,	they	are	attending	to	different	aspects	of	the	situation	and	interpreting	those	aspects	differently.	This	is	just	a	sketch	of	an	explanation	of	how	differences	in	social	backgrounds	influence	individuals’	social	interpretation.	To	fully	understand	when,	how,	and	what	mental	states	we	attribute	to	others	–	and	to	make	sense	of	profound	disagreements	about	social	interpretation	–	one	must	understand	how	these	social	psychological	determine	the	inputs	to	mindreading.19		
5.2	Mindreading	Processing		Two	factors	are	crucial	in	understanding	the	output	of	mindreading:	the	input	and	the	processing	(Epley,	2008).	The	previous	section	argues	that	social	psychological	data	shed	light	on	how	we	narrow	down	the	available	information	and	what	gets	taken	as	input	to	mindreading.	This	section	addresses	how	we	process	that	information.	The	data	on	goals	and	approaches	of	social	interactions	are	especially	relevant	here.																																																										19	One	could	understand	this	discussion	of	the	inputs	to	mindreading	in	terms	of	multiple	mindreading	systems,	e.g.,	Apperly	and	Butterfill	(2009).	On	such	a	view,	the	social	categorization	processes	I	describe	may	serve	as	input	to	either	low-level/perceptual/system-1	processes	or	high-level/inferential/system-2	processes.	Thanks	to	a	reviewer	for	suggesting	this	idea.		
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	 Depending	on	the	goals	that	we	have	for	social	interactions,	we	will	process	information	to	different	degrees.	To	the	extent	that	accuracy	is	an	important	goal	(e.g.,	when	we	will	be	held	responsible	for	our	attribution),	the	depth	of	processing	will	be	relatively	deep.	We	will	tend	to	deliberate	for	longer,	in	a	controlled	fashion,	and	about	more	aspects	of	the	interaction.	We	may	reflect	on	our	personality	trait	inferences,	behavior	evaluations,	our	own	perspectives,	and	our	mental	state	attributions	and	adjust	them	according	to	how	well	they	fit	the	situation	as	a	whole.	This	mindreading	strategy	will	be	effective	to	the	extent	that	we	are	well	practiced	in	this	type	of	reasoning	and	not	under	serious	cognitive	load	(Spaulding,	2016).		However,	to	the	extent	that	efficiency	is	a	primary	goal	(e.g.,	when	we	lack	the	motivation	to	deliberate),	the	depth	of	processing	will	be	more	limited.	In	these	cases,	we	use	projection	and	stereotypes	and	engage	in	very	little	adjustment.	These	heuristics	are	reliable	when	we	accurately	estimate	the	degree	of	similarity	between	the	target	and	ourselves.	Efficiency	goals	limit	the	depth	of	processing,	e.g.,	the	adjustment	of	our	mental	state	inferences.	Thus,	if	we	have	misjudged	the	degree	of	similarity,	these	heuristics	are	likely	to	lead	to	error	and	be	corrected	only	by	deliberative	processing	(Spaulding,	2016).	Finally,	we	often	are	motivated	by	self	interest	in	social	interactions,	and	accordingly	we	will	tend	to	limit	the	depth	of	processing	of	information	indicating	that	we	are	failures,	biased,	or	have	false	beliefs	about	the	world.	Of	course,	as	noted	above,	these	goals	and	approaches	are	not	mutually	exclusive,	and	many	social	events	will	involve	interaction	and	tradeoffs	among	these	different	goals	and	approaches.	To	take	just	a	couple	examples,	one	could	have	the	goal	of	accurate	
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mindreading	but	also	have	the	deliberative	processes	warped	by	self-	and	group-	enhancing	biases,	or	one’s	interpretation	based	on	stereotyping	could	be	further	cemented	by	confirmation	bias.	Extant	theories	of	mindreading	do	not	predict	the	ways	in	which	our	goals	restrict	the	depth	of	processing	with	respect	to	mental	state	inferences.	In	many	cases,	theories	of	mindreading	assume	that	our	goals	in	social	interactions	are	the	same	in	every	circumstance.	However,	these	data	show	that	our	goals	differ	in	various	situations	and	as	a	result	the	mindreading	strategies	we	adopt	differ	accordingly.	In	fact,	it	is	even	more	complicated	than	that.	In	each	situation,	we	have	various	goals	that	affect	how	we	interpret	various	aspects	of	the	situation.	As	a	result,	deliberation,	heuristics,	and	self-interested	biases	interact	and	influence	each	other.	Understanding	the	output	–	the	mental	state	attributions	–	requires	understanding	how	our	goals	shape	our	search	for	information	To	be	sure,	each	of	the	existing	theories	of	mindreading	could	integrate	some	of	these	data.	For	instance,	Theory	Theorists	will	find	evidence	for	their	view	in	accuracy-oriented	approaches.	Theory	Theorists	argue	that	the	process	of	inferring	an	agent’s	mental	states	relies	on	a	rich	body	of	information.	On	the	basis	of	our	folk	psychological	knowledge,	situational	knowledge,	and	beliefs	about	the	target	(including	group	membership,	personal	history,	etc.),	we	make	an	abductive	inference	about	the	agent’s	mental	states.	Although	the	theorizing	of	TT	need	not	be	conscious	or	explicit,	when	it	is	conscious	it	resembles	the	careful	deliberation	that	we	engage	in	when	we	have	accuracy	as	a	goal.	When	accuracy	is	a	goal,	we	try	to	take	into	consideration	various	aspects	of	the	situation	and	use	this	information	to	
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come	up	with	the	right	interpretation	of	the	target’s	mental	states.	Thus,	Theory	Theorists	easily	can	incorporate	the	data	on	accuracy-oriented	approaches.		In	contrast,	Simulation	Theorists	will	find	evidence	for	their	view	in	one	kind	of	efficiency-oriented	approach,	namely	projection.	The	ST	holds	that	we	understand	others	by	mentally	putting	ourselves	in	a	target’s	situation	and	figuring	out	what	we	would	think,	feel,	and	do	in	that	situation.	This	is	similar	to	the	approach	we	take	when	we	prioritize	efficiency	in	mindreading,	regard	the	target	as	relevantly	similar	to	us,	and	project	our	own	mental	states	to	a	target.	In	the	latter	kind	of	case,	we	attribute	to	the	target	the	beliefs,	desires,	emotions,	and	intentions	that	we	think	we	would	have	in	that	situation.	Clearly	Simulation	Theorists	easily	can	incorporate	these	data	into	their	theory.	The	information	presented	highlights	some	of	the	strengths	of	both	Theory	Theory	and	Simulation	Theory.	Both	theories	clearly	are	getting	something	right	about	mindreading.	The	empirical	evidence	suggests	that	we	do	deliberate	in	some	circumstances,	and	we	do	project	in	some	circumstances.	However,	clearly	the	monolithic	TT	and	ST	are	getting	something	wrong	too,	because	we	do	not	only	deliberate	and	we	do	not	only	project.	Hybrid	theorists	who	posit	a	conjunction	of	theoretical	and	simulational	processes	will	find	the	most	vindication	here,	as	a	central	finding	is	that	we	use	a	variety	of	mindreading	strategies.	The	data	on	deliberation	and	projection	can	be	integrated	into	hybrid	theories	fairly	straightforwardly.		However,	as	they	stand,	TT,	ST,	and	the	various	hybrid	theories	do	not	integrate	much	of	this	evidence.	In	particular,	none	of	these	theories	explain	or	
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predict	how	stereotypes	and	self-interest	biases	influence	our	mental	state	attributions.	This	is	important	because	stereotypes	and	self-interest	biases	are	pervasive.	One	may	wonder	whether	one	of	these	theories	would	have	an	easier	time	making	room	for	the	data	on	stereotypes	and	self-interested	biases.	It	seems	to	me	that	there	is	more	flexibility	in	the	TT	and	TT-oriented	hybrid	approaches.	Because	TT	posits	an	information-rich	mindreading	process,	part	of	this	information	base	could	be	beliefs	about	how	various	groups	of	people	behave	in	particular	situations,	i.e.,	stereotypes.	Furthermore,	there	is	a	rich	literature	on	how	various	cognitive	biases	influence	deliberation,	and	we	could	add	this	kind	of	data	to	TT	and	TT-oriented	hybrid	approaches.	The	ST	may	not	as	easily	integrate	stereotypes	about	how	various	groups	of	people	behave	in	particular	situations.	Such	an	addition	would	seem	ad	hoc	given	that	ST’s	purported	theoretical	advantage	over	TT	is	that	it	holds	that	mindreaders	do	not	rely	on	a	rich	body	of	information	when	interpreting	and	predicting	others’	behavior.	The	ST	may	be	able	to	include	background	information	about	cognitive	biases,	e.g.,	about	how	we	selectively	ignore	information	that	we	are	failures,	biased,	or	have	false	beliefs	about	the	world.	These	could	be	construed	as	constraints	on	the	simulation	process.	Finally,	a	hybrid	ST	theory	could	incorporate	data	on	how	we	sometimes	deliberate	carefully	and	make	an	inference	to	the	best	explanation	of	what	a	target’s	mental	states	are.		The	previous	paragraph	sketches	a	few	ways	(some	ad	hoc,	some	more	principled)	in	which	existing	mindreading	theories	could	integrate	some	of	the	data	I	have	discussed	here.	However,	the	implications	of	my	arguments	are	deeper	than	simply	pointing	out	unexplained	data	and	divvying	up	the	evidence	in	favor	of	one	
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mindreading	theory	over	another.	The	evidence	and	arguments	presented	here	provide	the	connective	tissue	to	unify	theories	of	mindreading.	Contemporary	hybrid	accounts,	e.g.,	Goldman	(2006)	and	Nichols	and	Stich	(2003),	gesture	at	the	plurality	of	mindreading	processes	by	noting	that	we	theorize	
and	simulate,	but	in	order	for	an	account	of	how	we	attribute	mental	states	to	be	unified	and	informative	it	has	to	do	more	than	simply	posit	a	conjunction	of	processes.	The	existing	models	of	how	we	understand	others	do	not	tell	us	much	about	the	sort	of	information	that	gets	taken	as	input	for	these	approaches,	how	the	information	received	as	input	is	processed,	how	deeply	we	process	this	information	with	each	of	these	approaches,	when	and	why	we	shift	between	these	mindreading	approaches,	and	how	accurate	any	of	them	are	(Spaulding,	2016).	Rather,	they	simply	posit	a	motley	collection	of	psychological	processes	with	little	explanation	of	how,	when,	and	why	we	use	these	different	psychological	processes	in	social	cognition.	The	discussion	here	helps	fill	in	some	of	these	gaps.	The	arguments	and	data	I	present	explain	how	our	goals	in	a	social	interaction	determine	our	approaches,	how	these	approaches	limit	or	enhance	the	depth	of	processing,	and	the	ways	in	which	our	subjective	perceived	similarity	judgments	influence	information	processing.	One	theoretical	upshot	of	this	discussion	is	that	identifying	how	these	social	psychological	phenomena	influence	how	we	attribute	mental	states	to	others	strengthens	hybrid	theories	by	filling	in	these	gaps,	and	it	moves	them	closer	to	the	goal	of	a	unified,	coherent	account	of	how	we	understand	others.		From	the	previous	section,	we	learned	that	individuals	with	different	social	characteristics	tend	to	take	different	information	as	input.	Individuals’	goals	are	a	
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further	source	of	divergence.	Even	if	individuals	with	different	social	backgrounds	have	the	same	goals	in	a	social	interaction,	their	approaches	will	differ	when	the	interaction	involves	in-group	or	out-group	members	and	when	individuals	feel	threatened	in	some	way	by	the	interaction.	If	individuals	have	different	goals	–	as	is	often	the	case	in	real	world	social	interpretation	–	not	only	will	they	take	different	information	as	input,	they	will	process	that	information	very	differently	as	well.		I	do	not	claim	that	individuals	who	have	different	stereotypes	and	make	different	perceived	similarity	judgments	never	converge	on	the	same	interpretation.	They	can	converge	on	the	same	interpretation,	especially	when	they	both	have	accuracy	as	a	goal	and	deliberate	carefully	about	the	situation	and	their	interpretations.	However,	this	kind	of	dialogue	is	effortful	and	it	requires	recognizing	the	ways	in	which	your	perspective	is	idiosyncratically	shaped	by	your	social	background.	Moreover,	careful	deliberation	is	a	not	a	guarantee	of	convergence	among	informed,	rational,	well-meaning	individuals.	The	conversation	between	the	This	American	Life	producer	and	police	officer	is	an	example	of	this.	Despite	their	explicit	goal	of	coming	to	some	consensus	about	the	Eric	Garner	video,	their	deliberative	mindreading	yielded	different	results.	Even	if	two	people	are	presented	with	the	same	evidence,	what	they	notice	and	how	they	approach	the	interaction	may	be	very	different,	they	may	have	different	self-interested	biases	shaping	their	interpretation,	and	therefore	their	interpretations	may	be	very	different	as	well.	Putting	all	of	this	together,	we	can	see	precisely	how	rational,	well-meaning	individuals	can	come	to	profoundly	different	interpretations	of	a	social	interaction.	
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6.	Conclusion	
	Philosophical	accounts	of	mindreading	tend	to	present	a	simplified	picture	of	how	we	understand	others	that	suggests	that	individuals	take	the	same	information	as	input,	process	this	information	in	a	similar	way,	and	generate	very	similar	mindreading	judgments.	Because	of	this	simplified	picture,	these	accounts	do	not	explain	or	predict	the	sort	of	divergent	social	interpretation	common	in	our	everyday	lives	and	dramatically	evinced	in	the	Eric	Garner	case.	The	arguments	advanced	here	show	that	this	simplified	picture	is	inaccurate.	Social	categorization	influences	what	we	attend	to	and	how	we	interpret	social	interactions.	Categorizing	individuals,	behaviors,	and	events	depends	on	the	situational	context,	our	experiences,	and	our	expectations,	and	these	may	differ	predictably	and	dramatically	among	individuals	with	different	social	backgrounds.	Augmenting	existing	accounts	of	mindreading	with	these	data	will	allow	us	to	explain	how	social	disagreements	arise	and	provide	us	with	a	more	realist,	accurate	account	of	how	we	understand	others.	The	arguments	highlight	a	further	important	theoretical	benefit	of	examining	these	data:	we	now	have	the	resources	to	construct	a	unified	account	of	mindreading.	Instead	of	simply	presenting	a	motley	conjunction	of	mindreading	processes,	now	we	are	in	a	better	position	to	explain	more	of	the	mindreading	processes	we	employ,	the	conditions	under	which	we	use	them,	and	how	information	is	processed	with	these	various	approaches.	This	is	the	goal	of	
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philosophical	accounts	of	mindreading,	and	these	arguments	bring	us	a	step	closer	to	realizing	this	goal.	I	began	this	paper	with	a	particularly	striking	example	of	diverging	mental	state	attributions:	disagreements	about	the	lethal	encounter	between	Eric	Garner	and	Staten	Island	police	officers.	Despite	the	seemingly	unambiguous	video	evidence,	rational,	informed,	well-meaning	individuals	differ	in	their	social	interpretation	of	this	encounter.	Accounts	of	how	we	understand	others	do	not	explain	or	predict	these	divergent	interpretations.	A	theoretical	payoff	of	the	discussion	in	this	paper	is	that	we	now	have	the	resources	to	explain	how	this	and	other	such	disagreements	can	arise	among	informed,	well-intentioned	people.	Furthermore,	supplementing	existing	theory	of	mind	accounts	in	the	way	I	suggested	yields	a	more	realistic	(and	perhaps	more	depressing)	picture	of	the	process	of	social	interpretation.	There	is	more	than	just	theoretical	payoff,	though.	We	often	find	ourselves	disagreeing	with	family,	friends,	neighbors,	and	strangers	on	social	media	about	the	social	interpretation	of	some	behavior.	Especially	in	contentious	disagreements,	like	the	social	interpretation	of	Eric	Garner’s	death,	our	response	to	people	who	disagree	with	us	is,	bluntly	put,	to	regard	them	as	intellectually	or	morally	deficient.	Certainly	some	people	who	disagree	with	us	are	intellectually	and/or	morally	deficient,	but	not	in	every	grave	disagreement.	Examining	the	ways	in	which	backgrounds	and	experiences	shape	our	interactions	with	others	can	help	us	pinpoint	the	sources	of	disagreement	among	informed,	well	meaning	individuals.	Moreover,	recognizing	that	everyone’s	perspectives	are	shaped	by	these	social	psychological	factors	should	
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make	one	less	dogmatic	about	one’s	social	interpretations.	Reducing	dogmatism	paves	the	way	for	productive	conversations	about	contentious	social	interpretations.	Such	conversations	may	not	resolve	all	disagreements	or	directly	prevent	the	kind	of	interaction	that	led	to	Eric	Garner’s	death,	but	they	are	a	good	start.	
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